The recent efforts for revitalizing traditional Iranian medicine (TIM) have shaped two main streams: The quackery traditional iranian medicine (QTIM) and the academic traditional iranian medicine (ATIM). The QTIM encompasses a wide range of practitioners with various backgrounds who work outside the academic arena and mostly address the public. These practitioners have no solid bases or limited boundaries for their claims. Instead, they rely on making misleading references to the Holy Islamic Scriptures, inducing false hope, claiming miraculous results, appealing to the conspiracy theories, and taking advantage of the public resentment toward some groups of unprofessional healthcare providers. The theories and practices of ATIM, however, can be categorized into two major categories: First, valid and scientific TIM that is aimed to conduct well-designed clinical trials and thereby, supply the evidence-based medicine with new treatments originated in or inspired by TIM. Second, a pseudoscientific part of the current TIM that is based on some obsolete medical theories, especially the medieval humoral medicine, and erroneous accounts of human anatomy, physiology, and physiopathology, mostly adopted from the ancient and medieval medical scripts. TIM has recently established some clinical centers for practicing humoral medicine that is partly pseudoscientific and involves significant risks. This paper suggests that the public health sector has a duty to act against the promulgation of medical superstitions by QTIM and the pseudoscientific medical practices of ATIM, and at the same time, support and promote the valid and potentially beneficial research pursued by ATIM aimed to explore the rich recourses of TIM and thereby enrich the evidence-based medicine.

The purpose of this paper is to assess Karl Raymond Popper’s “Criterion for Demarcation between Science and PseudoScience”. Here based on critiques of Larry Laudan, Imere lakatos, Thomas Kuhn, Harold Brown, and W. W. Bartley about the Criterion, new critiques about the demarcation theory are proposed. Criticizing the logical consequences of Popper is the model adopted in this study. In this assessment, Popper’s conventions for defining “Science”, is divided into three stages and every stage, in turn, is criticized.

The problem of diagnosing Science from pseudoScience- widely known as the Demarcation Problem- has both theoretical and practical significance in philosophy of Science. While for decades philosophers have tried to provide a satisfying solution to this problem, still there is no agreed answer to the question. The difficulties of demarcating Science from pseudoScience can be divided into two main categories: challenges for defining a demarcating criterion, and challenges for applying the criterion to the occurred cases. Whereas most of the debates are centered around the first category, this paper focuses on one problem from the second one. Specification of the authority who possesses the necessary competence and legitimacy to discern Science from pseudoScience is a difficulty for the application of demarcating criteria. It seems that the most complicated cases for this problem are those in which defenders of the suspected pseudoScience are themselves members of a scientific society. These cases are examples of a situation called “experts’ disagreement” in social epistemology. In this paper, I try to utilize insights from social epistemology about experts’ disagreement and complement them with the idea of “cognitive labor division” to overcome the challenge of finding the competent authority for identifying Science from pseudoScience.

The idea that Science is objective, or able to achieve objectivity, is in large part responsible for the role that Science plays within society. But what is objectivity? The idea of objectivity is ambiguous. This paper distinguishes between three basic forms of objectivity. The first form of objectivity is ontological objectivity: the world as it is in itself does not depend upon what we think about it; it is independent of human thought, language, conceptual activity or experience. The second form of objectivity is the objectivity of truth: truth does not depend upon what we believe or justifiably believe; truth depends upon the way reality itself is. The third form of objectivity is epistemic objectivity: this form of objectivity resides in the scientific method which ensures that subjective factors are excluded, and only epistemically relevant factors play a role in scientific inquiry. The paper considers two problems that arise for the notion of epistemic objectivity: the theory-dependence of observation and the variability of the methods of Science. It is argued that the use of shared standard procedures ensures the objectivity of observation despite theory-dependence. It is argued that the variability of methods need not lead to an epistemic relativism about Science. The paper concludes with the realist suggestion that the best explanation of the success of the Sciences is that the methods employed in the Sciences are highly reliable truth-conducive tools of inquiry. The objectivity of the methods of the Sciences leads to the objective truth about the objective world.

The Abrahamic religions include the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All of these religions consider Abraham as their ancestor, and they consider Science to be the knowledge of the universe and humanity, which are divine revelations. The framework of Science in the Abrahamic religions uses three basic concepts: 1) monotheism (as a fundamental principle, a single and all-encompassing Divine vision) 2) the universe (as a divine creation) 3) Science (as an all-encompassing knowledge about the world as the sign of God). The purpose of writing this paper is to find the common principles governing Science among Abrahamic religions, using a descriptive-analytical method based on library sources. The results of this research is an intellectual attempt to draw on the commonalities between various Abrahamic religions in the areas of constructive dialogue in the field of globalization, based on revelatory and spiritual teachings, to achieve the unification of the world, which is one of the divine promises and is rooted in the natural foundations of humanity.

The popularization of Science involves a broad range of activities, including the acceptance, understanding and participation in Science that common goal it of bridging the gap between Science and the general public. The aim of this paper is to investigate the importance of popularization of Science in reducing pseudo-Science in the Covid 19 period. In this paper, the method of documentary research has been used. With the prevalence of Covid 19 in the world, the importance of Science and its popularization in the world to reduce pseudo-Science has increased more than ever. Once again, humans relied on Science, scientists, and experts to discover the corona vaccine. Considering that, one of the important goals of popularization of Science is to fight against superstition and pseudoScience, critical thinking is one of the tools to combat pseudoScience.

Introduction: From a long time ago, benefiting from technology has been an inevitable thing for human interests, which is born and based on Science. It can be claimed that there is harmony between ethics, Science and technology, which promote each other. In this article, the researcher discusses this harmony and compatibility. Material and Methods: The current review study was descriptive and using the study of sources and research keywords among the books and articles published in the databases of Thomson Information Institute, Science Direct and Pub Med. Conclusion: As Science and technology continue to advance and become more integrated into our daily lives, ethical considerations become increasingly important. For example, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has raised questions about the potential implications of creating machines that can make autonomous decisions and take actions. If Science and technology were considered as a tool, it should have been able to subjugate humans and influence all aspects of behavior and values. While it has become a problem that eventually becomes aligned with morality by applying reason, and people now seek help from it as a tool.

The paper offers a distinctive reading of Popper’s work, suggesting that his Logic of Scientific Discovery (LScD) might be re-interpreted in the light of his Open Society. Indeed, Popper can be interpreted as criticising certain aspects of his first book, and as a result improving upon them, in his second. It suggests translating what Popper says about ‘conventions’ into his later vocabulary of ‘social institutions’. Looking back, I believe that Popper never intended the language of conventions and decisions to be read individualistically. I remain unsure whether Popper was himself quite as clear about this as he could have been.  My reading makes Popper a pioneer in the sociology of Science. Scientific institutions are arenas of political power; but Popper did not discuss the structure and inter-relations of the social institutions of Science, or offer a politics of Science in the context of his methodology. What is missing from the skeletal sociology of LScD is the politics. We could put it in Popperian terms this way: scientific institutions are both open and closed. They are closed, firmly, to the inexpert, to the non-members; supposedly they are open to the qualified, provided the prerogatives of seniority and leadership are acknowledged. Despite these shortcomings, Popper’s critical and rational approach and his insistence on openness and intellectual honesty are still important today.